Religion as Nationalism: The Religious Nationalism of American Christian Zionists by Sturm, Tristan
Religion as Nationalism: The Religious Nationalism of American
Christian Zionists
Sturm, T. (2017). Religion as Nationalism: The Religious Nationalism of American Christian Zionists. DOI:
10.1080/14608944.2016.1255187
Published in:
National Identities
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2017 Taylor & Francis.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:09. Sep. 2018
 1 
Religion as Nationalism: The Religious Nationalism of American Christian Zionists 
 
Author: Tristan Sturm 
Affiliation: School of Geography, Archaeology and Palaeoecology, Queen’s University 
Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK 
Email: t.sturm@qub.ac.uk 
Address: Elmwood Avenue, Belfast, UK BT9 6AY 
 
Abstract 
 The term “religious nationalism” is often theorized, at worst as antithetically conjunctive 
where religion is defined as the allegiance to God and nationalism is the allegiance to the 
nation, and at best as instrumental. I argue here that this fusion of religion and 
nationalism takes place most convincingly if we understand religion as adherent 
performance rather than solely as a theological container of tenants. I illustrate this 
through American Christian Zionist performances and discourses regarding their self-
imagined identity as being in a national diaspora for Israel. I argue this religious 
nationalism is possible because Christian Zionist performances of a national allegiance to 
Israeli Jews are grounded in an apocalyptic narrative of the future. 
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Introduction 
There is an almost religious devotion among all nationalisms to a territory or homeland, 
including frequent religious discourses embedded within performances of nationalism.1 
As John Agnew (2006, p. 185) notes, “much nationalism and imperialism have found 
purpose and justification in religious difference and in proselytizing.” Explicit and well 
known examples of functional, instrumental, and facilitative uses of religion are currently 
employed in Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States among many others for 
nationalist purposes (Bruce, 2003). But few scholars have wanted to go so far as to say 
the performance of religion can be through nationalism. This paper challenges and 
contributes to recent theories, produced largely in sociology, geography, and 
anthropology, regarding discourses and performances on the relationship between 
religion and nationalism. I argue that there is a particular kind of religious nationalism of 
American Christian Zionists, which challenges previous theorizations that suggest 
religion is nothing more than a foil for nationalism, namely that nationalism is employing 
religion for foundational myths and veracity. American Christian Zionists reverence for 
the imagined nation of Israeli Jews is instrumental to their belief in the Second Coming 
of Christ, but I argue it is no less a part of their religion practices and performances. I 
                                                 
1 Along with Sullivan (2011: 31), I believe that “any definitional stability to the terms ‘performance’ and 
‘performative’ is bound to be wobbly, yielding to the oncoming traffic of differentiated meanings and 
temporary construals.” Unlike Phelan’s (1993: 146) claim that “performance’s life is in the present,” I 
agree with Austin (1962) and Butler (1990) that ‘performative’ have lasting impacts on how we understand 
the past, present, and future. The collapsing of the terms performance/performative is then not used in this 
article to simply mean theatricality, but is an act: saying, writing, and doing. I use the term ‘performance’ 
here because I include non-verbal acts—like money transfers to settlement— to illustrate such actions as 
part of religious doing so as to move away from the immutable confines of researching religion as beliefs 
and doctrine.  
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argue that Christian Zionists perform nationalism as an essential part of their religious 
practice: religion as nationalism.2  
This paper is divided into three main sections below. The first section, “religion, 
nationalism, diaspora,” reviews various scholarly attempts to theorize religious 
nationalism, challenging them with the poststructuralist work of Talal Asad (2003). The 
second section, “territory and apocalypse,” provides a brief history of the idea of the 
apocalypse in America as it relates to the New World. It also sketches-out a brief history 
of post-Civil War American Protestant national interests in Palestine, illustrating a 
historical vacillation between millennial thought and a search for healing origin myths in 
relation to America. In the post-1967 period, I outline in depth how Christian Zionists 
gained political power in the U.S., fomented an outsider diasporic religious nationalism 
for Israel and Jewish Israelis, and how this identity today is shored-up by the 
performance of Islam as an evil Other. Through this history I provide discursive evidence 
from Christian Zionist leaders that their national loyalty is in the process of shifting from 
America to Israel as their perception of End Times draws closer.  
American Christian Zionists are made up of socially conservative Evangelicals3 
with a premillennial dispensationalist eschatology.4 Most believe the wars in the Middle 
East are portending an imminent End Times scenario, which will be centered in the 
modern state of Israel. Here Satan’s Russian and Arab led armies meet those non-
Raptured Westerners who serve Christ’s army at the battle of Armageddon (Sturm and 
                                                 
2 The converse, nationalism as religion, could only exist if a deity or the supernatural was central to the 
performance of nationalism. 
3 Christian Zionists are not exclusively Evangelicals, they are also Pentecostals. The main difference here is 
that Pentecostals believe they can channel the power of God immanently.  
4 Premillennialism is the belief that Christ will return prior to the millennium to save the world. 
Postmillennialism is the belief that there will be no intervention by God, only humans can bring about the 
millennium, whereupon Christ will return.  
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Dittmer, 2010). In a nutshell, this scenario largely defines the eschatological beliefs of the 
over 30 million American Christian Zionists (Haija, 2006, p. 75), without which, their 
national allegiance to the territory of Israel and the perceived religiously homogenous 
nation of Jews - hence Christian Zionism - would not be possible. Jews are seen as the 
Chosen People of Earth and are, therefore, to be unwaveringly supported as God’s army 
soldiering toward the apocalypse. Protestant Christians, on the other hand, are understood 
as the Chosen People of Heaven and a post-millennium Earth. This outsider diaspora 
nationalism is, I argue, a form of religious nationalism, where religious performances of 
the apocalypse provide the possibility and core discourse for a Christian Zionist 
nationalism for Jewish Israelis, and a statism for the territory of Israel. This is the inverse 
of instrumentally employing religious discourse for national ends. 
This story of American Christian Zionist nationalism is interesting and begs 
explanation precisely because it disrupts expectations of ethno-national-religious 
correspondence. It further shows an unexpectedly convergent expression of religious 
territoriality, thus contributing to theoretical observations that identities can be multiple 
and competing, a multiplicity of nationalistic positions (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). This 
“Judeo-Evangelical nationalism” is important precisely because it seeks to politically 
redefine the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, and Israel and America. As 
Boyer (1993, p. 78) explains in his commanding book on American cultural expectations 
of the apocalypse, such expectations are not merely reflections of other realities, but 
rather “apocalyptic cosmologies have functioned dynamically, helping to mould political 
and social ideology and thus influencing the course of events”. Indeed as Mearsheimer 
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and Walt (2007, p. 137-8) have recently made clear of the political, cultural, and 
economic implications of Christian Zionists:  
By providing financial support to the settler movement and by publically 
inveighing against territorial concessions, the Christian Zionists have reinforced 
hard-line attitudes in Israel and the United States and have made it more difficult 
for American leaders to put pressure on Israel. Absent their support, settlers 
would be less numerous in Israel, and the U.S. and Israeli governments would be 
less constrained by their pressure in the occupied Territories as well as their 
political activities. Plus, Christian tourism (a substantial portion occurring under 
the Evangelical auspices) has become a lucrative source of income for Israel, 
reportedly generating revenues in the neighborhood of $1 billion each year.  
 
Christian Zionists are motivated by an apocalyptic vision that co-constitutionally 
performs their nationalism for Israel/is. This hyphenation between Jews and Christians is 
a spatial relationship. It poses that if Israel can be possessed through law, colonialism, 
and performative definition, then so too can the credentials of truth and faith be 
possessed, validated, and confirmed. In other words, the possession of territory equates to 
a possession of truth. 
 
Religion, Nationalism, Diaspora 
There is almost a religious devotion among all nationalists to a territory or homeland if 
we accept Verdery’s (1996, p. 226) definition, using Boreman, of nationalism as 
“conscious sentiments that take the nation as an object of active devotion”. In line with 
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mainline sociology of religion, I define religion as a set of beliefs, actions, 
performances/rituals, and institutions of devotion that are founded on the existence of 
supernatural deities who can interfere with and judge earthly, spiritual, and heavenly 
scales of being (Appleby 2000, p. 8). From a poststructuralist perspective, however, 
“religion” would be defined by the actors and actions of self‐identified religious groups, 
but crucially, it is important to note that it is intimately wrapped into systems and 
domains and representations, society and economy. It does not operate independently as a 
separate variable. 
Much of the work on nationalism has tended to ignore religion or explain it as a 
function of nationalism. In this view, nationalism is a modernist project that replaces 
religion by emphasizing socioeconomic factors or cultural or political modernity 
(Durkheim, 2001; Gellner, 1994; cf Asad, 1999; Friedland, 2001). Care must be taken in 
fusing these two terms together as “religious nationalism” because there are often many 
reasons for, expressions of, and geographically specific types of nationalism. The use of 
religious signifiers is but one of them, and is often of secondary influence, 
epiphenomena, or used as a guise for political means (Agnew, 2008).  
Although nationalism certainly has a “spiritual principle,” as Ernest Renan 
(1996[1882], p. 52) classically observed, the attempt to formulate a theory for religious 
nationalism is one fraught with problems.5 There have been many attempts to fuse 
religion and nationalism as it relates to overlapping language, analogous histories, as a 
part of nationalism, or that there is a particular form of religious nationalism (Brubaker, 
                                                 
5 Although Juergensmeyer (1993: 1-2) argues that religious nationalism has replaced Cold War identities, 
like many scholars at this time looking for a new world order, based on political ideologies: “the new world 
order that is replacing the bipolar powers of the old Cold War is characterized… by the resurgence of 
parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances.” 
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2015). Some suggest the term is oxymoronic, as Brubaker (2006, p. 23) provocatively 
concluded: “nationalist politics is carried out in the name of the nation, religious politics 
in the name of God.” Despite this, I argue that this fusion takes place most convincingly, 
not in how national discourse is inflected by religious language, or how religious 
discourse is inflected with nationalist language, but rather, following Talal Asad’s (2003) 
demand, that we again understand the category of religion as one of performance rather 
than solely as belief. While this article makes use of texts, doctrines, and institutions, it 
focuses on doing as a category of analysis. Asad (1993) argues that the enlightenment 
restricted the definition of religion to one centred on text and dogma instead of on the 
adherents’ practices and discourses. Asad has attempted to move beyond the 
Durkheimian concept of a universal definition of ‘religion’. This relates to this research 
in that American Christian Zionists are unique not just as a group compared to 
mainstream Protestants and Catholics, but also on a congregational and individual level, 
with each social scale producing different practices that absorb and reorder specific 
tenants of American nationalism. Asad proposes that religion should be studied through 
the performances that give it expression. While not all nationalist expressions are 
religious, almost any can be adopted into a religious discourse and performed as such, 
just as any religion can adopt national allegiances as part of the ritualized performance of 
their religion (McAlister, 2008). As McAlister (2008, p. 875) explains, it is not that 
“everything is religion, it is just that religion can be virtually anything.” Therefore, what 
we assume to be nationalist language may also be religious practice through prayers, 
sermons, and pilgrimages, to mention only a few performances. Religious beliefs and 
performances are not cloistered off from culture, politics, and events nor can they be 
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essentialized into pure or correct doctrine free from change. This Christian Zionist 
nationalism is not only instrumental, Judaism has been internalized into the rites, rituals, 
and performances of the affirmation of their religious beliefs (Cohn-Sherbok 2006; 
Goldman 2010).6 Therefore, religion is not simply instrumental to nationalist ends, as in 
George W. Bush’s appeal to Judeo-Christian values (Kuo 2007). Nor is nationalism here 
simply instrumental to religious ends, where, for example, “nationalist language he 
[former President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] has sometimes used at home may be 
a cover for sincerely held pan-Islamic ends” (Feldman 2006, np). The performance of 
Zionism by Evangelical Christians is a performance of their religion. This is not to claim 
that Christian Zionists do not anticipate the state of Israel to be superseded by a 
Millennial Heaven on Earth, but rather that Judaism, Jews, and Israel are essential parts 
to the performance, and therefore practice, of their religion, regardless of them serving an 
imminent/immanent function in the continuum of history.  
The “nation” is often defined as a group of people who feel they share a common 
set of myths concerning a territory, sharing common experiences of danger, destiny, 
historical struggles, and cultural affinity in relation to common places. However, I argue 
the nation does not exist outside the performance of such binding myths. Instead these 
common performances are what can be termed with the verb, “nationalism,” or the doing 
                                                 
6 Christian Zionism is a contingent and mobile religious identity movement, that is increasingly interested 
in Judaism and Israelis as an unattainable higher tier in their religious hierarchy. These Evangelicals 
perform a ‘wanna-be’ nationalism for Israeli Jews. From over a year of participant observation with 
Christian Zionists in Israel and Palestine, I observed that Saturdays have often become the Sabbath; Jesus is 
usually referred to as Yeshua; obeisance to those Evangelicals who were able to find Jewish ancestry and 
make Aliyah; and much premillennialism has moved from pre-tribulation Rapture to post-tribulation 
Rapture, that is, the Rapture has been moved by most in the movement to come after the Tribulation, at the 
peak of Armageddon, so that Christians have to suffer along with Jews to during the wars to end all wars 
rather than escape. The instrumental logic here is they realized it was not only anti-Semitic and escapist to 
leave Jews behind to perish, but also and most importantly, because they increasingly see themselves as 
proto-Israelis and proto-Jews who are to suffer with them. 
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of the “nation” (Krishna, 1996; Calhoun, 2001; Agnew, 2008). My argument is consistent 
with theories that understand the nation as a social text. If we take this limited taxonomy 
of performance binding nationalism, then there emerges a type of nationalism among 
Christian Zionists. This is a nationalism understood as the performance of Christian 
Zionist traits of cohesion, heritage, and a destiny of the nation. It is cemented in selective 
interpretations of the Old Testament that imagine Israel as a redemptive national territory. 
Christian Zionists practice a particular form of disaporic nationalism that challenges 
notions of nationalist exclusivity. Christian Zionists can instead be described as 
performing an ethno-religious nationalism. This unique brand of nationalism emerges 
from American social, economic, ethnic, and racial anxieties, and forces us to reconsider 
how nationalism, religion, and space can be conceived together. 
Anthony Smith (2003) makes the argument that proto-nationalisms based on 
religious and ethnic groupings, what he calls “ethnies,” pre-existed and pre-disposed the 
Western world to modern nationalism. Smith is not arguing that nationalism is an ancient 
phenomenon, rather he was arguing that there are kinds of proto-nationalisms that shared 
certain myths and rituals with modern nationalisms, specifically an origin and descent 
story traced to a place. What is of interest here is Smith’s concept of an elect people as a 
chosen people with a Covenant (Lev 19-21; Duet 29: 14-15) that guide and construct an 
identity from laws and myths that set them apart from other ethnicities. The Old 
Testament argues that through Israel all other nations are blessed by their light (Isa 42:6-
7) thus theoretically connecting the “Goyim” to the Jewish nation. Modern nationalisms 
certainly pull from ancient texts as empirical, however specious, examples of their nation 
arching back to a dark and misty past. Smith argues that there was a premodern 
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foundation of the idea of special territory and a cosmic worldview. There is a 
territorialization of memories where collective memories are handed down about events 
and people in places. Smith argues that this is a process of the territorialization of 
memory from a specific religious tradition of salvation, but not from “religion” into a 
wider social (or Durkheimian) sense, or from some kind of religious tradition. This is 
different from the modernists. Rather Smith emphasizes long-term popular values, 
symbols, and traditions of sacred land which are taken up in the modern period and given 
new political dimensions, what he calls “deep cultural resources” (Smith 134, 165, and 
254, respectively). 
Smith outlines four kinds of religion based proto-nationalist cultural resources: (1) 
myth of ethnic election; (2) attachment of terrains as sacred; (3) yearning to recover the 
spirit of a golden age; and (4) regenerative powers of sacrifice to ensure glorious destiny. 
All of the above relate to Christian Zionism because their discourse and performance of 
religious nationalism stress that both Jews and Christians have been Chosen to reclaim 
sacred territory given to them in a Covenant with God which will result in an imminent 
return of Christ who will redeem them in Holy glory. Many nationalisms imagine 
themselves in these terms and this suggests that religion is often an imbricating factor in 
nationalist identifications. While often employed to make the argument for a “religious 
nationalism,” Smith’s analytical ideal-type argument for early foundations for 
nationalism is not argued here. Rather, I deny the primordial continuity suggested by 
Smith. Rather, nationalisms are emergent for a variety of economic, political, and socio-
spatial reasons that performativity cherry-pick historical resources to justify irredentist 
claims. Therefore, Christian Zionism is not an inevitable theological outcome, but is 
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rather performative within the socio-spatial, political, and economic milieu of the present. 
Therefore, Smith’s (2003, p. 254) analytic foundation is used here to illustrate the ways 
claims to “sacred foundations” and “deep cultural resources” are selectively pulled from 
the past and performed as authentic representations of Jewish and, co-constitutionally, 
Christian claims to Israel and Palestine. Nationalism is then selectively built from pre-
existing history but not in an inevitable and linear way. Rather it is a present performative 
re-making of nationalism that takes expression as a diaspora religious nationalism 
(Derrida, 1977; Butler, 1997). 
 
Religion-based diaspora nationalism 
A significant amount of recent literature has focused on diasporic or extra-territorial 
forms of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 2005). Diasporas are often the most 
extreme and unwavering nationalisms (Herb, 1999 p. 20). Christian Zionists are not a 
classical diaspora-based “nation.” Nevertheless, they share a common basic definition as 
a group of people living outside of a territory for which they claim irridenta rights, 
restoration commitments, and heritage. Their claims are based on myths and memories of 
a perceived “homeland,” many of which are imagined through the prism of the Bible. 
Conventionally, diasporas refer to having a sustained connection to a homeland and 
keeping ethnic and cultural community in place. It is commonly argued that there are 
three elements of any diaspora: (1) dispersion through space; (2) orientation to a 
homeland; and (3) boundary-maintenance within a larger polity (Safan, 1991). These 
definitional limits taken, Brubaker (2005, 3) rightly argues that rather than categorize “a 
diaspora” as a cultural fact, a diaspora should be approached through the stances, 
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projects, claims, idioms, and practices of those who identify themselves as “dispersed in 
space.” In the final section, I provide a case study comprising of Christian Zionist 
discourses regarding how they imagine themselves to be a religious nationalism in 
diaspora despite living in America. I will also examine their performances of an 
American “civic” constitution-based nationalism. It is this imagination and performed 
identification that allows Christian Zionists to have a diasporic national self-image.  
Foon (1986) argues that people can have a loyalty to two different ethnic groups 
and have two nationalisms because they serve two different functions. Much modern 
cultural theory suggests that harboring two conflicting ideas of “nation” is not necessarily 
caustic or competing (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). Following Gupta and Ferguson (1992), 
there is no isomorphic parallel overlap between categories of identity, religion, ethnicity, 
nation, and place. They write, “if we question a pre-given world of separate and discrete 
‘peoples and cultures,’ and see instead a difference-producing set of relations, we turn 
from a project of juxtaposing preexisting differences to one of exploring the construction 
of difference to one of exploring the construction of differences in historical process” 
(Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 16). Gupta and Ferguson (1992, p. 12) seek to make this 
clear through the American example, a diverse state and set of nationalisms, which calls 
into question these very categories. While there is an assumed overlapping of ethnicity, 
nationalism, territory, and religion, identities are more complicated, less austerely 
categorized, and territorially blurred of the bounded assumptions we wish to impose on 
them (Agnew, 1994).  
Gabriel Sheffer (2003, p. 232-233) distinguishes between “total,” “dual,” and 
“divided” diaspora loyalties. For Christian Zionists, their religious nationalism is 
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committed to God first, and America second, and therefore rejects Sheffer’s analytical 
gradient because of the narrow definition of loyalty attributed to the state.7 However, the 
echelon is not static or stable; it is the result of performative contingencies that have 
defined their modern identities. As such, the Christian Zionist love for Israel is a religious 
commitment based on future imagined history that sees a moral, religious, economic, and 
political decline in the United States and an ascendency of these attributes in Israel until 
the culmination of the Rapture.8 For example, John Hagee, a major Christian Zionist 
figure who heads a megachurch in San Antonio Texas and Chairs the charitable 
organization and Israeli lobby Christians United for Israel, has been clear concerning the 
moral, political, and religious position of the United States. Hagee writes: “the laws of 
God transcends the laws of the United States government and the U.S. State Department” 
(quoted in Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 150). In other words, in so far as the United 
States plays a role in this script, it is to support and protect Israel. In his 2006 book 
Jerusalem Countdown: A Warning to the World, Hagee suggests former President George 
W. Bush’s support for Israel “fulfills a biblical injunction to protect the Jewish state” 
which is leading to “a pivotal role in the second coming” (Hagee, 2006, p. 22). 
 
Ethno-religious vs. civic nationalism 
Understanding the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism is essential to 
grasping the meaning of the ethno-religious nationalism of the Christian Zionist 
movement. Both Brubaker and Smith make distinctions between civic and ethnic 
                                                 
7 In a recent poll, 42 percent of Christians saw themselves as Christian first and American second (Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, 2006, p. 3). 
8 Decline is in part a deviation from the “fundamentals” of Christian America, including issues of darwinist 
thought, ethnic diversity, megacities, liberal bible scholarship, industrial society, feminism, abortion, and 
other culture wars issues.  
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nationalism (Smith, 2003; Brubaker, 1992). The concept of American civic 
nationalism—otherwise referred to as the “American creed,” which is based on 
democratic and enlightenment beliefs upon which the American Constitution is 
founded— is alive and well and continues to bind Christian Zionists to the American 
state and people. Nevertheless it is thought to be under attack by a broad spectrum of 
culturally conservative Americans giving way to the so called “culture wars.” For 
Christian Zionists, this eroding of this civic nationalism is thought to be a sign of the End 
Times.  
Like French civic nationalism, American nationalism is largely assimilationist not 
pluralist. Therefore, while based demographically on immigration, it has a nativist 
expectation for conversion to the American creed. This is an especially poignant 
observation when that creed is imagined to be founded in a mythologized Jewish and 
Christian synergy, that is, Judeo-Christian (Kazin & McCartin, 2006). This mix of 
Protestantism and Enlightenment thought has been called “civil religion” in the United 
States (Bellah, 1976). However, Lieven (2004) argues that what he calls the American 
nationalist “Antithesis” or ethnic nationalism - a sometimes competing form of American 
nationalism - co-exists with civic nationalism, but has its roots in ethno-religious beliefs 
and Jacksonian ideals. While this latter form of nationalism is often subordinate to civic 
nationalism, it can rise to prominence in times of crisis. Imaginations of an imminent 
apocalypse and being an embattled minority, coupled with the belief that Israel and Jews 
are being persecuted globally, provide such crisis mentality. The imminence of the 
apocalypse is all the more heightened when juxtaposed against a perceived common 
enemy of the U.S. and Israel: Islam (Sturm, 2010). 
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It is this form of ethno-religious nationalism that Benedict Anderson predicted to 
be “the wave of the future,” one consisting of “ethnic and racial stereotypes, xenophobia, 
sectarian ‘multiculturalism’ and the more brutal forms of identity politics” (Anderson, 
1996, p. 12-13). For Lieven (2006, p. 6), in his condemnation of America’s support for 
Israel’s radical right, it is this ethno-religious nationalism that cements “America’s 
attachment to Israel, [where] ethno-religious factors have become dominant, with 
extremely dangerous consequences for the war on terror.” What distinguishes ethno-
religious nationalism from other cultural identities is not only its territorial and political 
dimensions and ideals, but also its commitment to the pursuit of authenticity (however 
mythical) of the heritage and destiny of the imagined national community. 
 
Territory and Apocalypse: Israel and Palestine as Alpha then Omega 
Countless sentiments of devotion comprise nationalism, but territory and a geopolitical 
imagination of it are key, especially in contrast to common enemies and neighboring 
territories. Agnew argues (2008), that nationalist binaries, e.g. “internal” and “external,” 
or “our nation” and “their nation,” make nationalism the most territorial of socialist, 
liberal, and nationalist ideologies. Similarly, Herb and Kaplan (1999, p. 2) argue that 
“territory becomes a vital constituent of the definition and identification of the group 
living within it.” 
Visions of an imminent apocalypse have provided binding territorial 
exceptionalism many times throughout history, from Munster in 1534-35 to the English 
Puritans who migrated to New England. The latter marks the beginnings of what historian 
Stephen Stein (quoted in Boyer, 1992, p. 68) calls “the Americanization of the 
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apocalyptic tradition.” The Puritans serve here as a brief example of a millennial 
attachment to place. As Avihu Zakai explains of the Puritan reverence with America’s 
shores, Puritan  
attitudes towards [New England] space according to eschatology and apocalyptic 
visions, or according to prophetic imagination… [led to a] desacralization of 
England as a scared place in providential history, [this] reveals their 
geoeschatologic and geoapocalyptic awareness that England was not elect but 
rather represented apostasy within the course of the history of salvation. And 
geoeschatolic and geoapocalyptic consciousness gives evidence as well of the 
sacralization of an alternative place within the eschatology and apocalyptic drama 
of salvation and redemption (Zakai, 1992, p. 72).  
Within this quote we can discern that England was, prior to migration, seen as sacred 
space, but that sacredness was eventually moved to New England (Zakai, 1992, p. 74). 
The New England Puritan interpretation of America’s shores, as Sacvan Bercovitch 
(1978, p. 41-42) succinctly argued, turned “geography into eschatology.” This story of 
cleansing the Puritans and Yankees in the waters of the Atlantic is a powerful one in 
American national identification, and one that continues to set America apart, not merely 
by distance from Europe, but by moral absolutes as to the uniqueness of being “born-
again” as American and Christian (Hughes, 2003). 
Christian Zionist territorial identification with Israel differs from both Puritan 
identification with America as the New Jerusalem and the post-Civil War American 
peripatetic fascination with Palestine. Post-Civil War America was fascinated by 
Palestine, casting its eyes past the American horizon for the first time in a generation 
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(Vogel, 1993). One mid-19th century Methodist Episcopal bishop and pilgrim to 
Palestine, Henry White Warren, for example, reminisced that “This [Palestine] is the first 
country where I have felt at home” (Quoted in Davis, 1996, p. 16). Palestine became at 
this time not only an origin myth but also a moral guide. 
 
Post-Civil War American protestant fascination with Palestine 
It is important to first flesh out this story of the 19th century “Holy Land Mania” to 
contrast the modern Christian Zionist reverence for Israel with the post- Civil War 
American obsession with Palestine (Obinzinger, 1999). The 19 th century American 
pilgrimage to Palestine’s landscapes was one of self-imagination and renewal after the 
deep and divisive scars of the American Civil War (Vogel, 1993). The thought was that if 
Palestine could be restored as sacred space, so too could America. As Obinzinger argues, 
“travel to Palestine allowed Americans to read sacred geography…. While the persistent 
preoccupations with the Bible and biblical geography stood at the ideological core of 
American colonial expansion, actual travel to Palestine allowed Americans to 
contemplate biblical narratives at their source in order to reimagine—and even to 
reenact—ethno-religious national myths, allowing them, ultimately, to displace the 
biblical Holy land with the American New Jerusalem” (Obinzinger, 1999, p. 5). 
Palestinian landscapes were, therefore, sacred spaces and the medium for American 
national self-definition for Protestants as a reminder of a morally pure beginnings. 
In the 19th century both Palestine and America were thought of as the twin cradles 
of civilization, where Palestine marked the alpha—the beginning—American marked the 
omega—the millennial destiny (Stephanson, 1995). By “Alpha and Omega” I do not 
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mean Jesus Christ (Revelation 1:8), but rather this binary serves as an illustrative allegory 
for sacred space-time: the sacred space of the beginning (Alpha) and the sacred space of 
the end (Omega). What makes the contemporary American Christian Zionist experience 
so interesting is that rather than reaffirming an American national identity, pilgrimage to 
Israel challenges that identity. Christian Zionists today increasingly are coming to see 
America as the moral antipode of a Jewish Israeli nation that fuses future redemption 
with a present (but adopted) nation. Israel, as we will see below, is emergent as both 
Alpha and Omega. 
Christian Zionists are largely disillusioned with the assumption of God’s divine 
providence attached to America as a new terrestrial space to live out a God given holy 
life. Playing on Hal Lindsey’s (1971) best-selling book of doom, The Late Great Planet 
Earth, Mark Hitchcock (2010), for example, has entitled his recent book with a more 
specific national focus, The Late Great United States. In it Hitchcock details the 
inevitable decline of the United States, the ascendant prominence of Israel, and the 
imminent prophecies to take place there. Similarly, Victor Mordecai, a Messianic Jew 
who is well known in Evangelical circles for his adamant anti-Islamic thought, argued 
that “Christianity is going out of style in America in favor of ethnic diversity represented 
by many immigrant groups and other faiths.” There is a “fading Judeo-Christian ethic in 
American,” as the title of his article laments. America is in decline then, not just 
economically or politically, but at its ethical core. Mordecai’s core values are biblically 
based, this is what he means by a “Judeo-Christian” foundation: one that has seen, as he 
points out, Muslims outnumber Jews four to one in America. Those who are to blame for 
this undercutting of America’s foundation via Muslim immigration are those who support 
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progressive politics. He writes, “Obama represents a synthesis of Muslim and ultra-left 
radicalism of the 1960s, both of which are inimical to the values of Judeo-Christian 
America and Israel” (Mordecai. 2010, p. 12; cf. Dittmer, 2010). As Grace Halsell also 
observed of the disenchantment of the American West for apocalyptic forms of 
Christianity, “since the ‘frontier’ of America is gone, they seek to recreate it elsewhere” 
(Halsell, 1986, p. 113-114). This perception of decline is not endemic to Christian 
Zionists alone, indeed most Americans have perceived America on moral decline since 
the end of the Second World War (Brown, 2012). 
19th century Palestine was not interpreted in alterity, but in a continuity that linked 
an origin story to Palestine - instead of Europe - and, therefore, to the material landscapes 
of the Bible. Therefore once solely the Alpha marking only an origin story, or what Smith 
termed “sacred foundations,” Israel is now largely perceived as both the space of Alpha 
and Omega (Smith, 2003, p. 254). The modern phenomenon is a Christian Zionist 
attempt to make Americans into Israelis, not Palestine into America. This enabled by the 
Christian Zionist’s acceptance of an apocalyptic vision of the future and a religious 
adoption of Jews as legitimate biblical actors. 19th century Palestine was not interpreted 
in alterity, but in a continuity that linked an origin story to Palestine - instead of Europe - 
and, therefore, to the material landscapes of the Bible. Therefore once solely the Alpha 
marking only an origin story, or what Smith termed “sacred foundations,” Israel is now 
perceived as both the space of Alpha and Omega (Smith, 2003, p. 254). John Nelson 
Darby, the inventor of the Rapture and dispensationalism, did see the Jews as the chosen 
earthly people, but he wasn’t a Zionist (Sandeen, 1970). Darby did not believe that there 
could be a Jewish return to the Promised Land which would be a fulfilment of prophecy 
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before the Rapture. He believed the next event in prophecy to be the Rapture itself. The 
Zionist innovation in premillennial dispensationalism has been to move from a strict 
futurist position to a modified historicism by arguing that 1948 was predicted in the 
Bible. Even in 1948, lots of dispensationalists did not believe it was. But the revised 1967 
Scofield Bible popularized the notion that Israel was God-given, prophetic sacred space 
and that Israeli Jews were the Chosen People of Earth whose return identified in the Bible 
was a sign of Christ’s imminent return (Boyer 158). 
Nevertheless, for most in the first 20th century, Evangelical imaginations Jews 
were often fraught with anti-Semitism that saw Jews serving an instrumental role in the 
End Times which culminated in a second Holocaust (Barkun, 2010; Weber, 2004; Boyer, 
1992; Cohen, 1979). Indeed the influential anti-Semetic fabrication, The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, suggested the mark of the beast was Jewish control of global finance and 
trade. Immigrant Jews were highly suspect, and even Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
disparagingly labeled a Jew for opening diplomatic relations with the USSR (Dittmer, 
2010). A populist envisioning of America as founded on a “Judeo-Christian” tradition 
emerged in political parlance as early as the 1930s in relation to the rise of Communism 
(Silk, 1986; Sturm, 2012), and Israel’s Muslim neighbors were increasingly seen as an 
emergent enemy of the Christian West. The prophecy that Jews would return to Israel and 
expand it to the biblical meets and bounds, gave way to the view that Jews were the 
Chosen People of the Earth. Thus unlike the 19th century Christian pilgrims to Palestine 
who were “friends of the Jews,” the president of the International Christian Embassy in 
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Jerusalem recently redefined them as being “full partners in fulfilling His eternal 
promises to re-gather His beloved people” (Bühler, 2008, p. 53).9 
 
Post-1967 making of Judeo-Evangelical nationalism 
With the Six-Day War of 1967 and growing Arab hostility against Israel throughout the 
mid-20th century, Christian Zionists increasingly focused on the role of Israel within the 
prophetic End Times scenario.10 The major sea-change came with the 1967 war that saw 
the unlikely defeat of Arab forces by a much smaller Israeli army. The occupation of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip had a convincing affect on American Evangelicals that 
major prophetic events were taking place in the Middle East. These events marked the 
beginning of their national shift and territorial identity toward Israel. 
Cohn-Sherbok (2000) points to America’s bicentennial year, 1976, as a time when 
several issues coalesced to reinvigorate Christian Zionism. These issues included the 
outgrowing of mainstream Protestantism, the election of born-again southern Jimmy 
Carter, and the election of Menachem Begin as Prime Minister of Israel (Cohn-Sherbok, 
2000, p. 165). American Christian Zionism became more involved in federal politics as 
well for many reasons that culminate coincidentally at this time (Bruce, 1988). It is in 
part the perceived decline of American Christian values that brought voters to the polls 
on issues of abortion, prayer in schools, intelligent design, homosexuality, the spread of 
‘liberal humanism,’ and the more recent example of stem cell research.  
                                                 
9 This emergent transition has been witnessed by the author from a near decade long ethnography with 
Christian Zionist pilgrims in Israel and Palestine. This paper, however, relies discourse analysis of 
secondary statements and texts from many of the most influential voices from with the Christian Zionist 
movement. There are, however, many anti-Semitic voices from within the movement which contest this 
emergent performance of religious nationalism for Israel and Israeli Jews. 
10 Koeing (2006), for example, correlates selective American catastrophes as God’s punishment to 
moments in history when American support for Israel waned or when America pressured Israel toward a 
resolution over the Palestinian occupied territories (see Clark, 2007: 252-55). 
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The values voter was originally mobilized by televangelists including: Pat 
Robertson, progenitor of the Conservative Coalition and voice of the 700 Club; Jerry 
Falwell, the founder of the Moral Majority; and Tim LaHaye, founder of the American 
Coalition for Traditional Values and co-author of the Left Behind novel series. These 
three men, in the revival of southern and conservative Christian voter bloc, coalesced 
around the “return” of so-called “Judeo-Christian” values.11  They also renewed 
American Christian interest in pilgrimage to Israel and Palestine. 
Central to this history is the beginnings of the “Judeo-Evangelical” relationship 
that brought together political and religious leaders in America and Israel, and 
Evangelical congregations and tourism money followed (Chafets, 2008).12 The mid-20th 
century roots of this Judeo-Evangelical relationship can be traced to Oral Roberts and 
Billy Graham, both of whom were particularly supportive of the Israeli state. In 
particular, Roberts laid the foundation for future Evangelical leaders to approach and be 
approached by every Israeli Prime Minister beginning with David Ben Gurion. Ben 
Gurion, while known as a secular Zionist who rarely enetered synagogue, met and 
allegedly “prayed” with Roberts in 1959 (Segev, 1998; Goldman, 2011). Despite his 
secular ethos, Gurion recognized the political and economic support of Christian Zionists. 
He helped facilitate the Sixth World Conference of Pentecostal Churches to take place in 
Jerusalem in 1961. There, he courted their beliefs, “[in Israel] today we are privileged to 
                                                 
11 Institutionally, the movement found a voice in the American political landscape in the early 1970s, but its 
language and ideology emerged much earlier (cf. Lichtman, 2008; Dochuk, 2011). That said, the interest in 
Jews and Judaism was a relatively recent post-World War II emphasis employed by the American 
conservative political right. Revisionist histories by cultural conservatives and especially culturally and 
theologically conservative Evangelicals has become a mainstay of reinventing the American tradition. See 
for example, Catherine Millard’s book, The Rewriting of America’s History (1991), which as its title 
suggests, “is dedicated to the glorious truth that this nation was established upon biblical principles: its 
founders were men of Christian nobility” (Millard, 1991, p. iv). 
12 Chafets (2008) first makes this hyphenation, “Judeo-Evangelical” (but on Jewish ethnic inclusivity, see 
also Ariel, 2000; Diamond, 1996; Ehrenhaus & Owen, 2004; Noll, 2008). 
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see the fulfillment of the prophecy and promise of the Bible” (Goldman, 2011, p. n.p.). 
Jerry Falwell’s relationship with Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel from 1977 to 
1983, has often been credited with being the relationship that led post-World War II 
American Evangelicals to acknowledge the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
as prophetic events. Begin was the first Israeli PM to openly support American 
Evangelical tourism to the “Holy Land” and Falwell’s ministries brought pilgrims by the 
thousands (Harding, 2000). In 1980, Falwell became the first non-Jew to be awarded the 
Jabotinsky medal for Zionist excellence (Cohn-Sherbok, 2006, p. 162).  
The relationship between the rise of Israeli right wing politicians and the Christian 
Right in America has coterminous parallels related to the settlement movement and the 
1967 and 1973 Israeli wars (Bruce, 1990; Lienesch, 1993). Ehud Spirnzak (1991) points 
out that Israel’s radical right began to gain political clout in 1967 by defining the 
occupied territories as part of biblical Eretz Yisrael. The messianism of the Israeli radical 
right, largely under leadership of Rabbi Rav Kook and his Gush Emunim settlement 
movement, was made possible by defining the secular state of Israel as a messianic 
means toward territorial maximalism (Deuternonmy 7:1-23) (Nyroos, 2001).13 
The Israeli and Palestinian landscape of Gush Emunim took on a millennial 
significance that differed from the German romantic landscape vision of Labour Zionist 
settlers (Friedland & Hecht, 2000). The former believed that possession, both visual and 
physical, was essential to the performance of a prophetic national identity. As Weizman 
                                                 
13 Almost 900 years later Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the early 20th-century thinker respected by most 
Orthodox Jews and revered by Religious Zionists, had similar sentiments. Like Maimonides, Kook saw 
Christianity as akin to idolatry, writing that “with Christianity and its concepts one should share nothing, 
not even what seems good or beneficial… It is only by distancing oneself from Christian concepts, and by 
implementing the absolute refusal to gain any benefit from that world of ideas, that our own intellects and 
sense of self will become purer and stronger” (Goldman, 2011). 
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(2007, p. 135) eloquently explains, “for most settlers, the landscape was not initially 
much more than a pastoral view, but for the ideologists of Gush Emunim, its 
topographical features were cast as national metaphors. A constructed way of seeing 
sought to re-establish the relation between terrain and sacred text.” For Christian Zionists, 
the proxy possession of landscape through their perceived national peers is essential to 
the production of their own Judeo-Evangelical nationalism. Therefore Christian Zionists 
have supported the “national religious” settler movement, whether they like it or not, in 
the quest for territorial maximalism. 
This definition gave agency to many orthodox Jews who had previously thought 
that Israel could only be founded by the hand of God. Israel’s capture of the Golan 
Heights, Gaza, and the West Bank in 1967 suggested to many that God’s hand was 
working through secular agents. For this burgeoning movement, settling these newly won 
territories was a self-fulfilling prophecy that would result in the return of the messiah 
(Sprinzak, 1991). The Israeli settler movement or “national religious” have facilitated the 
Judeo-Evangelical relationship as it relates to the occupation of territory and the 
exclusion of Palestinians. These expanded borders that now include Palestine have come 
to redefine the Israeli nation. Challenging those borders by suggesting a two-state 
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, for example, is understood to be synonymous 
with challenging the sanctity and integrity of the nation itself, and, more importantly, 
God’s prophetic work.  
This national “cartographic anxiety” of losing sacred territory is a motivating 
factor for most Christian Zionist pilgrims and is a rallying call for their political and 
economic efforts in Israel and America (Krishna, 1996). As a poignant example, the 
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televangelist pastor John Hagee openly contributes millions of dollars in Christian Zionist 
donations to settler movements.14 Pat Robertson, once said while interviewing Gershon 
Solomon (leader of the Temple Mount Faithful, a group focused on the building of the 
Third Temple) in 1991 that “we will never have peace until the mount of the House of the 
Lord is restored” (quoted in Ariel, p. 153-154). The International Christian Embassy in 
Jerusalem’s founding principle, for example, is to affirm Israeli sovereignty over the 
West Bank.15 
 
Judeo-Evangelical tradition and the exclusion of Islam 
European Christians often saw Jews the “outsiders within” and Muslims as the “outsiders 
outside” (Buchanan & Moore, 2003, p. 7). The latter’s presence defined the territorial 
limits of a Christian Europe. The most recent and obvious catalyzing event to demonize 
Muslims was 11 September 11 2001. This event seemed to provide evidence for Samuel 
Huntington’s then failing “clash of civilizations” thesis as well as the dualistic 
foundations of apocalyptic Christianity.16 This is symptomatic of a wider practice of how 
religious categories are grafted onto racial ones generally (Sturm, 2010).17 Muslims 
                                                 
14 John Hagee estimates that in 2009 alone, he contributed $58 million. Hagee’s support for settlements has 
resulted in a sports arena being named after him in the Jewish West Bank settlement of Ariel (Rutenberg, 
Mcintire & Bronner, 2010). 
15 A common meme among ex-pat Christian Zionists living in Israel, for example, is that Ariel Sharon’s 
coma was God’s punishment for removing settlers from Gush Katif. 
16 I say failing because of the vast amount of literature celebrating the 200th anniversary of Kant’s 
perpetual peace (Habermas, 1997). 
17 Race is thought to be descended from particular biblical individuals whose characteristics are generalized 
across whole “races” and “nations.” For example, Arabs are thought to be the heirs of Abraham’s cast-out 
son Ishmael, while Isaac is taken as the patriarch of the Jews. Abraham’s cast-out son Ishmael is thought to 
have begat Arabs, and his son Isaac, Jews for which the former is not only subservient to the latter as the 
preferred son, but was also given the Covenant to Israel. Furthermore, the descendants of Noah’s son Ham 
are thought to be Africans and his son Japheth are thought to be Europeans and, therefore, ancestral 
Americans. These generalizations are then used to make stereotypical character judgments, justify 
prejudice assumptions concerning social standing, and associate whole continents of people as either “evil” 
or “good” (See Dittmer 2010; Han 2010; Sturm 2010). 
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through immigration have become the threat to the Judeo-Christian tradition inside and 
are the threat outside. In this way, post-Cold War prophecy adopted, informed, and 
inflamed these binary qualifications between American Evangelicals and Arab Muslims, 
rendering both sides into divisive geopolitical halves.  
There is a broader history of this focus on Islam and the Middle East in prophetic 
events, which I have argued contributes to the raison d'être for Christian Zionist religious 
nationalism for Israel. The geopolitical focus of national Othering has shifted from the 
“Evil” character of Communist “Russia” during the Cold War to that of the Muslim 
Middle East in the post-Cold War period. Hal Lindsey (1970, p. 59), The late Great 
Planet Earth, claimed that “Russia is a Gog.” He takes his evidence not simply from the 
American Cold War fervour, but also from Israel when he quotes Israeli General Moshe 
Dayan (1915-1981) that “the next war will not be with Arabs, but with Russians” 
(Lindsey 1970, p. 59). Similarly, Tim LaHaye (1974, p. 73) gave reasons why Russia and 
not the Middle East was a harbinger sign of the End Times: “the present Middle East 
crisis is not…predicted for the end time [because] Egypt, a prominent ally of Russia 
today, is not listed in the group.” This is all placed in stark contrast to both Lindsey and 
LaHaye’s later focus on the coming Islamic invasion. For example, Lindsey (2002, p. 
235) wrote in 2002 that “the last war will begin with a coordinated attack against Israel 
by the Iranian led Muslim forces joined by Russia”.  The invasion is no longer led by 
Russia; instead it is “joined” by Russia and led by “Muslim forces.” 
This regional shift from the Soviet Union to the Middle East was a gradual one, 
beginning with the 1973 oil crisis and later with the Iranian Revolution. The shift was no 
doubt influenced by Walvoord’s 1974, Armageddon: Oil and the Middle East Crisis, 
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which outlines the rising power of the Middle East and Muslims in particular. Walvoord, 
was the president of the Dallas Theological Seminary, where Lindsey obtained a Th.M.. 
Walvoord observed what he called “Russia’s Downfall,” arguing that the “dramatic 
realignment of political and economic power on the international scene is already in the 
making…The power of Arab oil and European agriculture and industry may lead to a 
cartel that will eventually eclipse the power of both Russia and the United States in the 
Middle East” (Walvoord 1974, p. 125 and 20). Prophecy books increasingly emphasized 
Islam as evil in these times. 
Most, however, shifted their analysis to new geographical spheres, mainly the 
Islamic Middle East, after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Unlike Lindsey whose 
prophecy centered on Russia, another prophecy scholar, Mark Hitchcock (2002, p. 32), 
thought the geopolitics was clearly about: “Muslims, Muslims, and More Muslims.” This 
idea would later be shared by others, including the Left Behind series founders, LaHaye 
and Jenkins. Left Behind, a series that has sold more than sixty-million copies in ten-
years, locates the Antichrist Nicolae Carpathia’s Roman Empire head-quarters in the New 
Babylon in Iraq (LaHaye and Jenkins 1996). In his book, The Coming Islamic Invasion of 
Israel (2002), Hitchcock (2002, p. 33) outlines what he calls God’s “Top-Ten Most 
Wanted List.” He compares it to President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil”, suggesting 
they “all have one thing in common: Islam.”  
David Campbell, in his insightful work Writing Security (1998), illustrates how 
recycled fears of the Other can be powerful tools in keeping a moral order. The fear for 
and attachment to Israel, as a nation to be defended until the apocalypse, serves a similar 
function. It shores up and cements a moral national order (Northcott 2004, p. 10 and 17-
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20). However, fear of Muslims for the premillennialist is a form of security and not an 
inculcation of insecurity. The battle between “us” and “them” is bound in dramatic irony. 
Hitchcock (2003, p. 170) explains that “no matter how troubled we are, no matter how 
dark this world looks, we can know one thing beyond all doubt. We win.” War does not 
create a climate of anxiety, it takes up the Old World vision of stasis toward a New 
World future: it is a theatre to be embraced. War is embraced because of the certainty that 
“we” – by which he means Israeli Jews and American Evangelicals - “win” because of 
the certainty afforded by their prophetic geopolitical analysis.  
There have been many examples where powerful government representatives, 
from Presidents to members of Congress, have not only tried to redefine American 
history in favor of a “Judeo-Christian” foundation narrative, but have also tried to 
influence American foreign policy in favor of a “Judeo-Evangelical” relationship with 
Israel specifically with regard to territory. James Inhofe, Oklahoma Senator and Christian 
Zionist, in a speech to the Senate in 2002 entitled, “Seven Reasons Why Israel is Entitled 
to the Land,” makes it clear that Israel has irredenta rights to all land West of the 
Euphrates river up to the Mediterranean Sea including the Sinai Peninsula (Rossing, 
2004, p. 52-53). More recently, Michele Bachmann, Sarah Palin, Rick Perry, and Mike 
Huckabee stated that Israel should not give up Palestinian occupied territories because it 
was biblically promised to Jews (Lizza, 2011; Kalman, 2009). On a recent pilgrimage to 
Israel, Huckabee told the New Yorker that a two-state solution would not happen “on the 
same piece of real estate” (Levy, 2010, p. n.p.). Rather, the Palestinians, whom he denies 
legitimate nationality, are strictly an Arab problem. He was also quoted expressing his 
“Judeo-Evangelical” nationality saying, “I worship a Jew!... I have a lot of Jewish 
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friends, and they’re kind of, like, ‘You Evangelicals love Israel more than we do.’ I’m, 
like, ‘Do you not get it? If there weren’t a Jewish faith, there wouldn’t be a Christian 
faith!’” This territorial identification with Israel and the national ethno-religious 
identification with Jews is one set against a racialized exclusion of Arabs and Islam.  
The national division of insider and outsider can take dramatic shifts in times of 
geopolitical change (Agnew, 2003). But most interesting is a new religious identification 
that sees Jews as not just a question of a shared text, values or tradition, something that in 
and of itself is difficult for most American Protestants to relate to, but also the genealogy 
that often took on a tone of family, blood, and race that excludes some in favor of others. 
Jews were rewritten into God’s contemporary interventions in history.  The proof was the 
reestablishment of Israel, including God’s clear territorial sovereignty and protection of it 
(Goldman, 2011). Jews became once again the people of the Book and took on a 
transcendent role for the redemption of all Christians. In other words, Jews became 
insiders.  
Central to this definition of inside/outside is where Christian Zionist national 
allegiances are placed. Common among Christian Zionists is the assumption that 
dissention or criticism of Israel is synonymous with criticizing God: Israel is God’s work. 
Indeed, today, for Christian Zionists, America still holds a moral voice and is respected 
as a homeland for purposes of civic or constitutional nationalism. This civic nationalism, 
as illustrated above however, takes second place to the imagined moral light of Israel and 
Jews. The foreign policy of Israel is infallible and inerrant while American foreign policy 
is sinful if it challenges Israeli policy. Israel always trumps America. William Koenig, a 
former third-party presidential candidate on the Christian Right, has recently published 
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two books in which he argued that both Hurricane Katrina and September 11, 2001 were 
God’s responses to wavering American support for Israel. Koenig’s book, Eye to Eye 
(2006), argues that all recent history of major catastrophes on American soil were God’s 
vengeance against the US for asking Israel to arrange a peace plan with Palestine. 
Koenig’s book succinctly captures what he believes is an undeniable correlation, rather 
than coincidence and selective history:  
What do these major record-setting events have in common? The ten costliest 
insurance events in U.S. history; The twelve costliest hurricanes in U.S. history; 
Three of the four largest tornado outbreaks in U.S. history; The two largest 
terrorism events in U.S. history. All of these major catastrophes and many others 
occurred or began on the very same day or within 24-hours of U.S. presidents 
Bush, Clinton and Bush applying pressure on Israel to trade her land for promises 
of “peace and security,” sponsoring major “land for peace” meetings, making 
major public statements pertaining to Israel’s covenant land and /or calling for a 
Palestinian state…. [The Bible states] ‘And it shall come to pass in that day, that I 
will seek to destroy all the nations that come against Jerusalem’ (Zechariah 12:9) 
(Koenig, 2006, p. 1). 
The feeling among Christian Zionists is that America is in moral, economic, and political 
decline. At times, America itself becomes the enemy of Judeo-Evangelical nationalism. 
Unlike the 19th century American pilgrims seeking to cleanse the morality of their 
American nation in Palestine, Christian Zionists today understand Israel as being the new 
millennial promise while America is irrevocably lost as a moral guide. Israel is now both 
Alpha and Omega.  
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Conclusion 
Susan Harding (2000) argues that Christian Zionists read history backwards, from the 
future to the present. The Christian Zionist national identification to Israel and Jews is 
grounded in an eschatological narrative of the future. They know what is going to 
happen, just as the mythical histories presented as the heritage of the Judeo-Christian 
Tradition present what happened. As one scholar of eschatology put it, Christian Zionism 
is an ethno-religious national identity that is framed by anticipation for a “future history” 
(Schussler, 1985, p. 40). 
 Christian Zionists are motivated by an apocalyptic vision that co-constitutionally 
performs Israel and their Judeo-Evangelical nationalism with politically consequential 
implications for the future of America and Israel/Palestine. This hyphenation between 
Jews and Christians is a spatial relationship. It poses that if Israel can be possessed 
through law, colonialism, and performative definition, then so too can the credentials of 
truth and faith be possessed, validated, and confirmed. In other words, the possession of 
territory equates to a possession of truth. Such broad Christian Zionist eschatological 
expectations are often performed with little variation where deviation from 
eschatologically discursive norms as to an alternative future is anathema to maintaining 
deep attachments to particular places and spiritual convictions. 
 I have argued above that this future orientation has led many American 
Evangelicals to develop a religion based diaspora nationalism. While instrumental to their 
expectation for the apocalypse, Israel and Israeli Jews have become a central part of their 
religion and their performance of it. This religion as nationalism concept is 
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contemplatable if we understand religion not from the position of doctrine and belief, but 
rather the performances of Christian Zionists. I argue that Christian Zionist nationalism is 
a new and emergent development. American Christian interest in Palestine in the post-
bellum years up to the founding of Israel in 1948, was one of renewal, a return to the 
moral beginnings of their religion, nation, and society. But with the founding of the Israel 
State and the occupation of territory in 1967, American Evangelicals increasingly saw the 
wheels of prophecy turning, and Israeli Jews as central co-terminus actors in an imminent 
battle on Earth between good and evil. Centrally, this has led American Christian Zionist 
loyalty to begin to shift from America to Israel as they see America’s conservative 
cultural values being eroded which signals the End Times, a phase of history where Israel 
is central to their eschatological concerns. Compounding the performance of apocalyptic 
imminence is the perception of Islam as the biblical evil hordes of Gog and Magog. The 
hyphenation of Judeo and Christian is key to developing a future, dualist memory 
dividing what is inside—“ours”—and outside—“theirs”—in often simplistic geopolitical 
divisions drawn up between Jews and Christians on the one hand, and everybody else—
especially Muslims—on the other. 
 
 
References 
Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international 
relations theory. Review of International Political Economy, 1 (1), 53-80. 
 
Agnew, J. (2003). Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics. New York: Routledge. 2nd ed. 
 33 
 
Agnew, J. (2006). Religion and geopolitics. Geopolitics, 11 (2), 183-191. 
 
Agnew, J. (2008). Nationalism. In J. Duncan, N. C. Johnson & R. H. Schein (Eds.), A 
companion to cultural geography (pp. 223-238). Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. New York: Verso. 
 
Anderson, B. (1996). Introduction. In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the nation (pp. 12-
13).  New York: Verso. 
 
Ariel, Y. (2000). Evangelizing the chosen people: Missions to the Jews in America, 1880-
2000. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Asad, T. (1993). Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity 
and Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Asad, T. (1999). Religion, nation-state, secularism. In P. van der Veer & H. Lehmann 
(Eds.), Nation and religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (pp. 178-196). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 34 
Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press. 
 
Austin, J. L. (1962) How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Barkun, M. (2010). The new world order and American exceptionalism. In J. Dittmer & 
T. Sturm (Eds.), Mapping the end times: American Evangelical geopolitics and 
apocalyptic visions (pp. 119-131). Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Bellah, R. N. (1976). Civil Religion in America. Daedalus, 96 (1), 1-21. 
 
Bercovitch, S. (1978). The American Jeremiad. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Boyer, P. (1992). When tomorrow shall be no more. Cambridge: Belknap Press.  
 
Brown, A. (2012). Americans’ Negativity about U.S. Moral Values Inches Back Up. 
Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/154715/americans-negativity-moral-values-inches-
back.aspx 
 
Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1-19. 
 35 
 
Brubaker, R. (2006). Religion and nationalism: Four approaches. Presented to the 
conference, Nation/religion, Konstanz, July 6-8, 1-23. 
 
Brubaker, R. (2015). Grounds for difference. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bruce, S. (1988). The rise and fall of the Christian Right: Conservative Protestant 
politics in America 1978-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Bruce, S. (2003). Politics and religion. Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Buchanan, A & Moore, M. (2003). Introduction: The making and unmaking of 
boundaries. In A. Buchanan & M. Moore (Eds.), States, nations, borders: The ethics of 
making boundaries (pp. 1-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bühler, J. (2008). The history of Christian Zionists: An ancient and noble tradition now 
flourishes. The Lion of Judah 2008 Feast of Tabernacles conference program. Jerusalem: 
International Christian Embassy Jerusalem. 
 
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. New York: Routledge. 
 36 
 
Calhoun, C. (2001). Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Campbell, D. (1998). Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Chafets, Z. (2008). A match made in Heaven: American Jews, Christian Zionists, and one 
man’s exploration of the weird and wonderful Judeo-Evangelical alliance. New York: 
Harper Perennial. 
 
Cherry, C. (1998). God’s new Israel: Religious interpretations of American destiny. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Clark, V. (2007). Allies for Armageddon: The rise of Christian Zionism. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Cohen, A. (1970). The myth of the Judeo-Christian tradition. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Cohen, N. W. (1979). Antisemitism in the Gilded Age: The Jewish view. Jewish Social 
Studies, 41 (3), 187-210. 
 
Chon-Sherbok, D. (2006). The politics of apocalypse: The history and influence of 
Christian Zionism. Oxford: Oneworld. 
 37 
 
Cohn-Sherbok, D. (2000). Messianic Judaism. London: Continuum. 
 
Davis, J. (1996). The landscape of belief: Encountering the holy land in Nineteenth-
Century American art and culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Debrix, F. (2008). Tabloid terror: War, culture, and geopolitics. New York: Routledge.  
 
Derrida, J. (1977). Ltd., Inc. abc.... Glyph, 2 (1), 162-254.  
 
Diamond, S. (1996). Right-wing politics and the anti-immigration cause. Social Justice, 
23 (1), 154-168. 
 
Di Rienzo, S. R. (2002). The non-optional basis of religion, Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions, 3 (1), 75-98;  
 
Dittmer, J. (2010). Obama, son of perdition? Narrative rationality and the role of the 44th 
President of the United States in the end-of-days. In J. Dittmer & T. Sturm (Eds.), 
Mapping the end times: American Evangelical geopolitics and apocalyptic visions (pp. 
73-98). Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Dochuk, D. (2011). From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk religion, grassroots politics, 
and the rise of Evangelical conservatism. New York: Norton. 
 38 
 
Durkheim, E. (2001). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Ehrenhaus, P. and Owen, S. (2004). Race lynching and Christian Evangelicalism: 
Performances of faith. Text and Performance Quarterly, 24 (3), 276–301. 
 
Feldman, N. (2006). “Islam, terror and the second nuclear age.” New York Times 
Magazine. Oct 29. Last assessed 16/04/15: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 
 
Foon, C. S. (1986). On the incompatibility of ethnic and national loyalties: Reframing the 
issue. Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 13 (1), 1-11. 
 
Friedland, R. & Hecht, R. (2000). To rule Jerusalem. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Friedland, R (2001). Religious nationalism and the problem of collective representation. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 27 (1), 125-152. 
 
Gellner, E. (1994). Encounters with nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
 39 
Gilroy, P. (1993). The black Atlantic: Modernity and double consciousness. New York: 
Verso. 
 
Goldman, S. (2010). Zeal for Zion: Christians, Jews, and the idea of the promised land. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
 
Goldman, S. (2011). What do we mean by ‘Judeo-Christian’?  ReligionDispatches, 
January 21. Retrieved: December 15, 2011, from 
http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/3984/what_do_we_mean_by_%E2%8
0%98judeo-christian%E2%80%99_/ 
 
Gregory, D. (2004). The colonial present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. Malden: 
Blackwell. 
 
Gupta, A. & Ferguson, J. (1992). Beyond ‘culture:’ Space, identity, and the politics of 
difference. Cultural Anthropology, 7 (1), 6-23. 
 
Habermas, J. (1997). Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, with the benefit of two-hundred 
years. In J. Bohman & M. Lutz-Bacmann (Eds.), Perpetual peace essays on  
Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal (pp.113-154). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Hagee, J. (2006). Jerusalem countdown: A warning to the world. Lake Mary, FL: 
Frontline. 
 40 
 
Haija, R. (2006). “The Armageddon Lobby: Dispensationalist Christian Zionism and the 
Shaping of US Policy Towards Israel-Palestine.” Holy Land Studies 5(1), pp. 75-95. 
 
Halsell, G. (1986). Prophecy and politics: The secret alliance between Israel and the U.S. 
Christian Right. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books. 
 
Han, J. (2010). Reaching the Unreached in the 10/40 Window: The Missionary 
Geoscience of Race, Difference and Distance. In J. Dittmer and T. Sturm (eds.), Mapping 
the end times: American Evangelical geopolitics and apocalyptic visions (pp. ). Farnham: 
Ashgate. 
 
Hanson, V. D. (2002). An autumn of war: What America learned from September 11 and 
the War on Terrorism. New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Harding, S (2000). The book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist politics and language. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hartley, L. P. (2002 [1953]). The go-between. New York: The New York Review of 
Books Press. 
 
Hitchcock, M. (2010). The late great United States: What Bible prophecy reveals about 
America’s last days. Sisters, OR: Multnomah Books. 
 41 
 
Herb, G. H. (1999). National identity and territory. In G. H. Herb & D. H. Kaplan (Eds), 
Nested identities: Nationalism, territory, and scale (pp. 9-30). Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
 
Herb, G. H. & Kaplan, D. H. (Eds) (1998). Nested identities: Nationalism, territory, and 
scale. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Hitchcock, M. (2002). The Coming Islamic Invasion of Israel. Oklahoma: Hearthstone 
Publishing. 
 
Hitchcock, M., (2003). The Second Coming of Babylon. Sisters, Ore.: Multnomah 
Publishers. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (Eds.) (1983). The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Canto 
Press. 
 
Hughes, R. T. (2003). Myths America lives by. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 
 
Huntington, S. (2003[1996]). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
 42 
Jendrysik, M. S. (2008). Modern jeremiahs: Contemporary visions of American decline. 
Lanham: Lexington Books. 
 
Juergensmeyer, M. (1993). The new cold war? Religious nationalism confronts the 
secular state. Berkeley: University of California. 
 
Kallai, Z. (1997). The patriarchal boundaries, Canaan and the land of Israel: Patterns and 
application in Biblical historiography. Israel Exploration Journal, 47 (1), 69-82. 
 
Kalman, M. (2009). Huckabee’s first 2012 campaign stop: Israel. Time.com. Aug 19. 
Retrieved: December 15, 2011, from 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1917389,00.html 
 
Kazin, M. & McCartin, J. A. (Eds.) (2006). Americanism: New perspectives on the 
history of an ideal. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Koenig, W. R. (2006). Eye to eye: Facing the consequences of dividing Israel. Phoenix: 
About Him. 
 
Kuo, D. (2007). Tempting Faith: An Inside Story of Political Seduction. New York: Free 
Press.  
 
 43 
Krishna, S. (1996). Cartographic anxiety: Mapping the body politic. In H. Alker Jr. & M. 
Shapiro (Eds.), Challenging boundaries: Global flows, territorial identities (pp. 193-
215). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
LaHaye, T. F. & Jenkins, J. B. (1996). Left Behind: A Novel of Earth’s Last Days. 
Wheaton: Tyndale House. 
 
Levy, A. (2010). Prodigal son: Is the wayward Republican Mike Huckabee now his 
party’s best hope? The New Yorker, 28 June. 
 
Lewis, B. (1987). The Jews of Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lichtman, A. J. (2008). White Protestant nation: The rise of the American conservative 
movement. New York: Grove. 
 
Lienesch, M. (1993). Redeeming America: Piety and politics in the new Christian Right. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Lieven, A. (2004). America right or wrong: An anatomy of American nationalism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lindsey, H. (1971). The late great planet earth. New York: Bantam. 
 
 44 
Lindsey, H. (2002). The everlasting hatred: the roots of Jihad. Murrieta: Oracle. 
 
Lizza, R. (2011). Leap of faith. The New Yorker, 15 August. 
 
Lowenthal, D. (1985). The past is a foreign country. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Marsden, G. M. (1980). Fundamentalism and American culture. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
McAlister, M. (2003). Prophecy, politics, and the popular: The Left Behind series and 
Christian fundamentalism’s New World Order. The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102 (4), 
773-798. 
 
McAlister, M. (2008). What is your heart for?: Affect and internationalism in the 
Evangelical public sphere. American Historical Literature, 20 (4), 870-895. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. J. & Walt, S. M. (2007). The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Millard, C. (1991). The rewriting of America’s history. Camp Hill, PA.: Christian 
Publications. 
 
 45 
Mordecai, V. (2010). Fading Judeo-Christian ethic in American. Israel Today, 137. 
 
Mullin, C. (2010). Islamist challenges to the ‘liberal peace’ discourse: The case of Hamas 
and the Israel-Palestine ‘peace process.’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39 
(2), 525-546. 
 
Murphy, D. (2009). Sarah Palin urges Israel settlement expansion, attacks Barack Obama. 
Christian Science Monitor. Nov. 18. 
 
Noll, M (2008). God and race in American politics. A short history. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Northcott, M. (2004). An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American 
Empire. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Nyroos, L. (2001). Religeopolitics: Dissident geopolitics and the ‘fundamentalism’ of 
Hamas and Kach. Geopolitics, 6 (3), 135-157. 
 
Obinzinger, H. (1999). American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the holy land mania. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
 46 
Pew global attitudes project. (2006). Muslims in Europe: Economic worries top concerns 
about religious and cultural identity. Washington: Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press, July 6. 
 
Phelan, P. (1993). Unmasked: The politics of performance. London: Routledge.  
 
Renan, E. (1996[1882]). What is a nation? In G. Eley & R. G. Suny (Eds.), Becoming 
national: A reader (pp. 41-55). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rossing, B. (2004). The rapture exposed: The message of hope in the Book of Revelation. 
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Rutenberg, J., Mcintire. M. & Bronner, E. (2010). Tax-exempt funds aid settlements in 
west bank. New York Times, July 6. Retrieved: December 15, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/world/middleeast/06settle.html. 
 
Safan, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myth of homeland and return. 
Diaspora, 1 (1), 83-99. 
 
Sandeen, E. R. (1970). The roots of fundamentalism: British and American 
millenarianism, 1800-1930. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
 47 
Schultz, K. M. (2011). Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews held postwar 
America to its Protestant promise. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schussler, F. (1985). Book of Revelation: Justice and judgment. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press. 
 
Secor, A. (2001). Islamist politics: Anti-systemic or post-modern movements? 
Geopolitics, 6 (3), 117-134. 
 
Segev, T. (1998 [1986]). 1949: The first Israelis. New York: Owl Books.  
 
Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Silk, M. (1984). Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition. American Quarterly, 36 (1), 65-
85. 
 
Smith, A. D. (2003). Chosen peoples. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sprinzak, E. (1991). The ascendance of Israel’s radical right. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
 48 
Stephanson, A. (1995). Manifest Destiny: American expansion and the empire of right. 
New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Sturm, T. and Dittmer, J. (2010). Introduction: Mapping the End Times. In J. Dittmer and 
T. Sturm (eds.), Mapping the end times: American Evangelical geopolitics and 
apocalyptic visions (pp. 1-23). Farnham: Ashgate,  
 
Sturm, T. (2010). Imagining apocalyptic geopolitics: American Evangelical citationality 
of evil Others. In J. Dittmer & T. Sturm (Eds.), Mapping the end times: American 
Evangelical geopolitics and apocalyptic visions (pp. 133-154). Farnham: Ashgate.  
 
Sturm, T. & Bauch, N. (2010). Nationalism and geography: An interview with  
Rogers Brubaker. Geopolitics 15 (1), 185-196. 
 
Sturm, T. (2012). The immanence of an imminent apocalypse: Christian  
Zionists and Israel as the new redeemer nation-and-state. Relegere: Studies in  
Religion and Reception, 2 (2), 333-341. 
 
Sullivan R. (2011). Geography speaks: Performative aspects of aeography. Farnham: 
Ashgate. 
 
Verdery, K. (1996) Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’?. In G. Balakrishnan (Eds.), 
Mapping the nation (pp. 226-33). New York: Verso. 
 49 
 
Vogel, L. I. (1993). To see a promised land: Americans and the holy land in Nineteenth 
Century. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Walvoord, J. F. (1974). Armageddon: Oil and the Middle East Crisis. Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan. 
 
Weber, T. P. (2004). On the road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals became Israel’s 
best friend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 
 
Weizman, E. (2007). Hollow land: Israel’s architecture of occupation. London: Verso. 
 
Zakai, A. (1992). Exile and kingdom: History and apocalypse in the Puritan migration to 
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
